I work on one of the most fundamental notions in epistemology—i.e., epistemic value, or that which we pursue when we want to find out what the world is like—and on how to set up social institutions in a way that promotes such value.
In recent work, I have defended the idea that true belief is the only fundamental epistemic value. Relying on that theory, I have also:
- defended a consequentialist virtue epistemology (see here and here), and explored the de-biasing potentials of virtues of deference and listening, as part of Wake Forest’s Character Project;
- argued that our dual tendency for bias and overconfidence gives us reason to accept a form of epistemic paternalism on which we’re sometimes justified in interfering with the inquiry of others without their consent but for their own epistemic good;
- explored the problem of public ignorance, pitfalls of social deliberation, and prospects for using information markets for informed and legitimate decision-making in liberal democracies; and
- investigated the virtues and vices of cognitive outsourcing, i.e., of handing over (outsourcing) one’s information collection and processing (the cognitive) to others, as part of Lund University's project Knowledge in a Digital World, funded by the Swedish Research Council.
At present, I’m involved in a project investigating
- the problems and prospects for epistemic consequentialism (see here and here). The project is conducted together with Jeff Dunn (DePauw) and funded by the British Academy. As part of the project, Jeff and I are editing a volume on epistemic consequentialism for Oxford University Press.
You'll find my contact information at the foot of this page.