I work on one of the most fundamental notions in epistemology—i.e., epistemic value, or that which we pursue when we want to find out what the world is like—and on how to set up social institutions in ways that promote such value.
In recent work, I have defended the idea that true belief is the only fundamental epistemic value. Relying on that theory, I have also:
- defended a consequentialist virtue epistemology (see here and here), and explored the de-biasing potentials of virtues of deference and listening, as part of Wake Forest’s Character Project;
- explored the problem posed for democracy by public ignorance and the pitfalls of relying on social deliberation in democratic decision making;
- done experimental work on self-resolving information markets in collaboration with Dysrupt Labs, to explore whether such markets can be made to match traditional markets in accuracy, without relying on external events in settling pay-offs;
- defended a form of epistemic paternalism on which we’re sometimes justified in interfering with the inquiry of others without their consent but for their own epistemic good; and
- explored cognitive outsourcing, i.e., the handing over (outsourcing) of one’s information collection and processing (the cognitive) to others, as part of Lund University's project Knowledge in a Digital World.
At present, I’m working on
how to make anti-immigration sentiments responsive to evidence of the economic benefits of immigration, as part of a Leverhulme-funded project together with the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR).
- defending epistemic consequentialism (see here and here). The project is conducted together with Jeff Dunn (DePauw) and funded by the British Academy. As part of the project, Jeff and I are editing a volume on epistemic consequentialism for Oxford University Press.
You'll find my contact information at the foot of this page.