“Esoteric Reliabilism,” the Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, November.
“‘Prove your Worth and then You Can Stay’: Why not to Base Immigration Policy on Attitudes about High-Quality Immigrants”, Epistemology, Democracy, and Disagreement, Georgetown University, October.
“The Case for Modelled Democracy”, Political Epistemology, the Institute of Philosophy, London, May.
“Why no True Reliabilist Should Endorse Reliabilism,” Bloomsbury Epistemology Group, London, December.
“On Cognitive Outsourcing”, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, October.
“Fake News: How to Deal with Bullshit”, Knowledge in a Digital World, Lund University, Sweden, April.
“Plato Behind Bars”, Philosophy in the Real World, University of Reading, April.
“Self-resolving Information Markets”, Department of Computer Science, University College London, March.
“An Introduction to Information Markets”, Department of Computer Science, University College London, March.
“Two-level Consequentialism and the Problem of the Epistemic Machiavellian”, University of Copenhagen, July.
“Epistemic Heroes and Duties to Inform”, the Royal Institute of Philosophy Seminar, University of Nottingham, February.
“A Consequentialist Virtue Epistemology”, the Approaches to Philosophy Series, Birkbeck, University of London, February.
“Censoring Online Bullshit,” Knowledge Dissemination in the Digital Era, Modena, Italy, November.
“Epistemic Heroes and Duties to Inform,” Workshop on Sanford Goldberg’s Assertion, University of Warwick, July.
“The Costs of Epistemic Realism,” University of Southampton, June.
“Is Reliabilism a form of Consequentialism?” University of Hamburg, May.
“Against the Bifurcation of Virtue”, University of Bristol, December.
“What’s the Problem with Cognitive Outsourcing?” the Annual Meeting of the European Epistemology Network, Madrid, June-July.
“In Defense of Epistemic Consequentialism,” Departmental Seminar, Department of Philosophy, Durham University, March.
“What’s the Problem with Cognitive Outsourcing?” Department of Philosophy, Lund University, November.
“Testimonial Justice and the Virtue of Deference,” Final Research Colloquia of the Character Project, Wake Forest University, June. You can watch a video of the talk here.
“The Virtue of Listening,” Educating for Intellectual Virtue, Loyola Marymount University, June.
“Testimonial Justice as Complete Fairness,” the Epistemology Brown Bag Series, Northwestern University, May.
“Epistemic Authority and the Problem of the Dogmatic,” the Philosophy Colloquium, University of Oklahoma, April.
“The Social Virtue of Blind Deference,” the Philosophy Society, the University of Sussex, April.
“Why We Can’t Rely on Ourselves for Epistemic Improvement,” the Epistemology Research Group, University of Edinburgh, December.
“Epistemic Paternalism and Personal Autonomy,” Workshop on Political Theory, Aarhus University, November.
“Getting it Right” (with Stephen Grimm), the Aims of Inquiry and Cognition, University of Edinburgh, May.
“The Costs of Epistemic Realism,” Expressivism and Epistemic Normativity, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France, May.
“The Case for Epistemic Paternalism,” the Danish Philosophical Society, Roskilde University, March.
Commentator for L. O’Brien’s “Self-Knowledge, Passing Thoughts, and Inner Speech,” the XIXth Annual Conference of the Sociedad Filosofica Ibero Americana (SOFIA) on Epistemic Agency, Huatulco, Mexico, January.
“Required Trust,” the 3rd Copenhagen Conference in Epistemology: Trust and Inclusiveness, University of Copenhagen, August.
“What’s so Good about a Wise and Knowledgeable Public?” the Bled Epistemology Conference, Slovenia, June.
“What’s so Good about a Wise and Knowledgeable Public?” Lingnan University, Hong Kong, April.
“Moderate Epistemic Expressivism,” the Danish Philosophical Society, University of Copenhagen, March.
“Why Deliberative Democracy (Still) is Untenable,” Political Legitimacy and Disagreement, University of Copenhagen, February.
Commentator for A. Hiller’s “Does Knowledge Have an Independent Truth Condition?”, Eastern APA-meeting, Boston, December.
“Required Trust,” Workshop on Epistemic Trust, University of Copenhagen, December.
“Required Trust,” the Higher Seminar, Lund, November.
“Epistemic Paternalism: A Defense,” Lund-Copenhagen Workshop in Social Epistemology, Copenhagen, November.
Commentator for J. Weinberg’s “What Good is Disagreement?”, Epistemic Norms from a Naturalistic Viewpoint, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, October.
“Beyond Deliberation,” the 2nd Copenhagen Conference in Epistemology: The Epistemology of Liberal Democracy, August.
“Epistemic Paternalism,” The Epistemic Benefits of Free Speech and Disagreement, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, December.
“Agency and Amelioration: Re-evaluating a Cartesian Project,” Responsible Belief in Face of Disagreement, VU University Amsterdam, August.
“Agency and Amelioration: Re-evaluating a Cartesian Project,” University of Copenhagen, Denmark, August.
“Why Reliaiblism is the New Internalism,” the University at Albany, SUNY Graduate Conference in Epistemology, April.
“Solving the Generality Problem,” the 1st Annual Graduate Philosophy Conference at Western Michigan University, December.
“Epistemology and Empirical Investigation,” the 2007 Workshop of the Danish Epistemology Network, Copenhagen, Denmark, May.
“On A Posteriori Analysis in Epistemology,” the Graduate Student Colloquium at UMass Amherst’s Department of Philosophy in March.
“An Argument Against Swamping,” the 4th Biennial Rochester Epistemology Conference in Rochester, NY, October.