Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij | Ph.D.

Talks

 
  Photo credit : Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University.

Photo credit: Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University.

2018

  • “Esoteric Reliabilism,” the Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, November.

  • “Why not to Base Immigration Policy on Preferences for ‘Good Immigrants’”, Epistemology, Democracy, and Disagreement, Georgetown University, October.

  • “The Case for Modelled Democracy”, Political Epistemology, the Institute of Philosophy, London, May.

2017

  • “Why no True Reliabilist Should Endorse Reliabilism,” Bloomsbury Epistemology Group, London, December.

  • “On Cognitive Outsourcing”, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, October.

  • “Fake News: How to Deal with Bullshit”, Knowledge in a Digital World, Lund University, Sweden, April.

  • “Plato Behind Bars”, Philosophy in the Real World, University of Reading, April.

  • “Self-resolving Information Markets”, Department of Computer Science, University College London, March.

  • “An Introduction to Information Markets”, Department of Computer Science, University College London, March.

2016

  • “Two-level Consequentialism and the Problem of the Epistemic Machiavellian”, University of Copenhagen, July.

  • “Epistemic Heroes and Duties to Inform”, the Royal Institute of Philosophy Seminar, University of Nottingham, February.

  • “A Consequentialist Virtue Epistemology”, the Approaches to Philosophy Series, Birkbeck, University of London, February.

2015

  • “Censoring Online Bullshit,” Knowledge Dissemination in the Digital Era, Modena, Italy, November.

  • “Epistemic Heroes and Duties to Inform,” Workshop on Sanford Goldberg’s Assertion, University of Warwick, July.

  • “The Costs of Epistemic Realism,” University of Southampton, June.

  • “Is Reliabilism a form of Consequentialism?” University of Hamburg, May.

2014

  • “Against the Bifurcation of Virtue”, University of Bristol, December.

  • “What’s the Problem with Cognitive Outsourcing?” the Annual Meeting of the European Epistemology Network, Madrid, June-July.

  • “In Defense of Epistemic Consequentialism,” Departmental Seminar, Department of Philosophy, Durham University, March.

2013

  • “What’s the Problem with Cognitive Outsourcing?” Department of Philosophy, Lund University, November.

  • “Testimonial Justice and the Virtue of Deference,” Final Research Colloquia of the Character Project, Wake Forest University, June. You can watch a video of the talk here.

  • “The Virtue of Listening,” Educating for Intellectual Virtue, Loyola Marymount University, June.

  • “Testimonial Justice as Complete Fairness,” the Epistemology Brown Bag Series, Northwestern University, May.

  • “Epistemic Authority and the Problem of the Dogmatic,” the Philosophy Colloquium, University of Oklahoma, April.

  • “The Social Virtue of Blind Deference,” the Philosophy Society, the University of Sussex, April.

2012

  • “Why We Can’t Rely on Ourselves for Epistemic Improvement,” the Epistemology Research Group, University of Edinburgh, December.

  • “Epistemic Paternalism and Personal Autonomy,” Workshop on Political Theory, Aarhus University, November.

  • “Getting it Right” (with Stephen Grimm), the Aims of Inquiry and Cognition, University of Edinburgh, May.

  • “The Costs of Epistemic Realism,” Expressivism and Epistemic Normativity, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France, May.

  • “The Case for Epistemic Paternalism,” the Danish Philosophical Society, Roskilde University, March.

  • Commentator for L. O’Brien’s “Self-Knowledge, Passing Thoughts, and Inner Speech,” the XIXth Annual Conference of the Sociedad Filosofica Ibero Americana (SOFIA) on Epistemic Agency, Huatulco, Mexico, January.

2011

  • “Required Trust,” the 3rd Copenhagen Conference in Epistemology: Trust and Inclusiveness, University of Copenhagen, August.

  • “What’s so Good about a Wise and Knowledgeable Public?” the Bled Epistemology Conference, Slovenia, June.

  • “What’s so Good about a Wise and Knowledgeable Public?” Lingnan University, Hong Kong, April.

  • “Moderate Epistemic Expressivism,” the Danish Philosophical Society, University of Copenhagen, March.

  • “Why Deliberative Democracy (Still) is Untenable,” Political Legitimacy and Disagreement, University of Copenhagen, February.

2010

  • Commentator for A. Hiller’s “Does Knowledge Have an Independent Truth Condition?”, Eastern APA-meeting, Boston, December.

  • “Required Trust,” Workshop on Epistemic Trust, University of Copenhagen, December.

  • “Required Trust,” the Higher Seminar, Lund, November.

  • “Epistemic Paternalism: A Defense,” Lund-Copenhagen Workshop in Social Epistemology, Copenhagen, November.

  • Commentator for J. Weinberg’s “What Good is Disagreement?”, Epistemic Norms from a Naturalistic Viewpoint, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, October.

  • “Beyond Deliberation,” the 2nd Copenhagen Conference in Epistemology: The Epistemology of Liberal Democracy, August.

2009

  • “Epistemic Paternalism,” The Epistemic Benefits of Free Speech and Disagreement, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, December.

  • “Agency and Amelioration: Re-evaluating a Cartesian Project,” Responsible Belief in Face of Disagreement, VU University Amsterdam, August.

  • “Agency and Amelioration: Re-evaluating a Cartesian Project,” University of Copenhagen, Denmark, August.

2008

  • “Why Reliaiblism is the New Internalism,” the University at Albany, SUNY Graduate Conference in Epistemology, April.

2007

  • “Solving the Generality Problem,” the 1st Annual Graduate Philosophy Conference at Western Michigan University, December.

  • “Epistemology and Empirical Investigation,” the 2007 Workshop of the Danish Epistemology Network, Copenhagen, Denmark, May.

  • “On A Posteriori Analysis in Epistemology,” the Graduate Student Colloquium at UMass Amherst’s Department of Philosophy in March.

2006

  • “An Argument Against Swamping,” the 4th Biennial Rochester Epistemology Conference in Rochester, NY, October.